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CHAPTER V 
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN" 
1. Formal Education and Indoctrination 
THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
Education has been given much attention by North Korean leaders in 
their efforts to carry out the "socialist revolution." Reorganization of the 
educational system established by the Japanese colonial administration was 
necessary to meet an urgent need for trained leaders to carry out Communist 
programs and to educate the young in Communist ideology. After a series of 
changes in 1946, 1953, 1959, 1966, and 1972, North Korea in 1972 had a 
comprehensive general educational system called "universal compulsory ten- 
year senior middle school education." At the end of the Japanese occupation, 
primary education consisted of six years of school, called kugmin haggyo, or 
nationaI school. Under Communism, the name "national school" was soon 
changed to inmin haggyo, or people's school. In 1946 elementary education 
was reduced by one year, and in 1953, after the Korean War, further reduced 
by one year to a period of four years. The old five-year middle school system 
of Japanese colonial times was divided in 1946 into two levels, three years of 
middle school (chung haggyo) and three years of high school (kodung hag- 
gyo). This system continued through the 1950s. Meanwhile, the four years of 
people's school education became compulsory in 1956. The reform in 1959, 
which was actually put into effect in September 1960, changed the three-year 
high schools into two-year technical schools (kisul haggyo) and two-year 
senior technical schools (kodung kisul haggyo). No change was made at that 
time in the middle schools. These changes in secondary education should be 
understood in relation to the mobilization of manpower for economic 
development during the early 1960s, when agricultural cooperativization 
had been completed, and implementation of the first five-year economic 
development plan (1957-1961) was under way. Skilled laborers, junior 
technicians, and technical specialists were urgently needed to carry out the 
various economic development programs, and in 1959 the technical and 
senior technical schools were given the task of training them. Thus, out of the 
pre-Communist secondary school, only the first three years of middle school 
remained as an extension of general education. Another educational change 
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in 1959 established a "seven-year compulsory education system" that covers 
four years of elementary school and three years of middle school. 
In the 1966 reform, which was put into effect in April 1967, the three- 
year middle schools were merged with the two-year technical schools to form 
five-year middle schools. Compulsory education was now extended by two 
years to make a "nine-year compulsory technical education system,"' 
covering four years of elementary education and five years of middle school. 
Thus, technical education became an integral part of compulsory education. 
At this time the two-year senior technical school was renamed "high school" 
without significant change in its curricula. 
Until the latest reform in 1972, to be described later, admission to high 
school involved more than a continuation of education. In most cases, 
graduation from middle school marked the turning point in the lives of the 
young generation. They were then formally eligible to work and earn an 
income, and many received no additional formal education. High school 
served as a preparatory institution for college education, and those who were 
admitted to high school were almost assured a college education. Unless they 
were regarded as unqualified for advanced education, high school graduates 
were admitted to college. 
High school graduates were not allowed to continue their higher 
education immediately. Instead, they were required to work on the farms or 
in factories and other industrial enterprises for two years and to experience 
for themselves the farmers' and workers' life. There is no doubt that this 
policy was aimed primarily at integrating formal education with economic 
activities of production. From an economic standpoint no particular 
advantage is evident in the practical training that preceded college 
education. The experience did, however, help the young people to identify 
with the working people. 
The 1966 reform had also created two kinds of institutions of technical 
education on the same level as the high school. These were three-or-four-year 
senior technical schools called kodung kisul haggyo, the old name for high 
school, and two-year vocational schools (chigop haggyo). The entrance 
requirement for either of the two kinds of technical schools was graduation 
from a five-year middle school. Both schools were designed to train middle 
school graduates as junior technicians or junior specialists in a shorter time 
than the regular six to seven years of advanced education combining high 
school and college. 
At the end of 1972, North Korea carried out a fifth reform in its 
educational system, which extended the period of compulsory education by 
one year to a total of ten years. Children now enter elementary school one 
year earlier, at age six rather than seven, and remain for four years. The five 
years of middle school have now become six years of "senior middle school" 
(kodung chunghaggyo), which is divided into two stages of three years, called 
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN" 97 
junior course (chunghagban) and senior course (kodungban). The old two- 
year high school was abolished. Those who are selected for higher education 
now go from the senior course to college after two years of practical work 
experience. Thus, education before entering college has been reduced by one 
year to a total of ten years. 
The revised system of primary and secondary education appears 
structurally identical with that existing during the period 1953-1959, except 
that the children now begin primary school one year earlier. Through a series 
of reforms in content, however, technical education has been firmly 
institutionalized as a major part of secondary education, which is no longer 
merely an extension of primary education. 
The latest educational reform brings substantial advantages to 
economic development, and eases the problem of labor shortage, since the 
newly-adopted educational system makes it possible for the young to 
complete their secondary education at age sixteen, two years earlier than 
under the old system. According to the North Korean Constitution as revised 
at the end of 1972 (Article 29), the minimum working age is set at sixteen, the 
age at which secondary education is completed. The system allows the 
mobilization at a youthful age of a substantial number of fairly well educated 
citizens for activities of production and provides a supply of young people, 
the graduates of the senior middle schooIs, with technological knowledge. 
In rural areas the compulsory educational system is run by the local 
authorities of the cooperative farms and, although called "free" education, is 
financed by the farms. Among the expenses, teachers' salaries take the major 
share. For about ten years beginning in the late 1950s, three types of teachers 
were distinguishable on the basis of the sources of their support: those solely 
dependent on the cooperative farm funds, those who received their food 
rations from the cooperative farms' funds and salaries from state funds, and 
recipients of state funds alone. Toward the latter part of the 1960s, however, 
financial and other responsibility for the operation of the primary and 
secondary educational system was transferred from the central government 
to local authorities, except for the assignment of teachers and the fixing of 
teachers' salaries, which are still handled by the central government. In other 
words, each cooperative farm absorbs the entire cost of its primary and 
secondary schools, including expenses for teachers' salaries and grain rations 
and for management costs of school facilities. Although the duration of 
universal compulsory education has been substantially expanded since 1956, 
the expansion has cost the central government little in rural areas. 
In the past the majority of peasant families had seldom been able to 
afford education for their children beyond primary school. Parents now bear 
no direct financial burden for their children's education. The fact that every 
child of school age is entitled to ten years of education seems to be 
responsible in large measure for convincing the farmers that the central 
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government is working for them. Paying little attention to the fact that they 
themselves pay for the universal compulsory education, the farmers appear to 
be very proud of the "benevolence" of their own socialist system of 
government and, in particular, of their leadership. Such confidence in the 
merits of their system has been an important factor in the integration of the 
entire population. 
College education covers either four or five years, depending upon the 
field of study. The present system still requires the taking of an entrance 
examination for admission to college, but this examination seems to be a 
mere formality. Recommendations submitted by the heads of the workshops 
where the candidates work are the most important factor in the selection of 
students. In general, these recommendations include evaluation of 
personality, political behavior, political thought, and work records. Family 
background is also important. Descendants of the former well-to-do families 
of "reactionary" backgrounds are usually not permitted access to advanced 
education unless they have proven themselves to have been completely 
rehabilitated. Since all candidates are required to have at least two years of 
practical work experience before they apply for admission to college, this 
period allows careful examination of their loyalty toward the state and their 
revolutionary zeal. 
In addition to the general education system described above, there are 
two supplementary systems, the special education and the adult education 
systems. The special education system is run entirely by the state 
government, that is, by the Communist Party. Its largest division consists of 
schools to train specialists in the arts and foreign languages. These 
specialized schools include in their curricula such fields as painting, music, 
and dance, and certain foreign languages. The students of the specialized 
schools are selected while in kindergarten on the basis of judgments that they 
have "exceptional talent." Once admitted to the special schools, they are 
trained in their fields for eleven years, corresponding with the elementary and 
secondary education of the general education system. Upon graduation, they 
serve the state government, unless they are selected for advanced education 
at the colleges or universities. Also incIuded in the special education system 
are schools for the bereaved children of deceased revolutionaries (hyong- 
myong yujanyo hagwon) who rendered distinguished service. The Com- 
munist regime regards these children as valuable assets for the future, 
and their special schools are designed to train them to become core elements 
to cany out the revolutionary cause. 
Education for illegitimate children who have been abandoned by their 
parents draws our special attention. Although sexual intercourse outside 
marriage is strictly prohibited, North Korea has a problem of illegitimate 
children. It may be attributed partly to changes in social relationships 
between sexes; social contact between the sexes in daily life had never 
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN" 99 
previously been so close, particularly among farmers and industrial workers. 
The traditional image of the young Korean woman as being shy, submissive, 
and faithful to her husband no longer appears to be accurate. As I have 
earlier noted, there is no question about a rise in the status of women. The 
campaign for women's rights, in which considerable effort was expended 
under the Communist regime, appears to have been influential in raising 
their status, but, as we have seen, the primary factor appears to have been 
their economic importance under the new conditions of life. 
Children born outside wedlock, particularly to widows or unmarried 
women, were traditionally looked down upon, as were their mothers. In 
contemporary North Korea, the same attitude toward illegitimacy appears to 
remain in somewhat weakened form, although overt expression of the 
attitude is restrained. Unmarried mothers frequently give up their children 
and let the governmental agencies raise them, and such children are 
welcomed by the government. According to one of my informants, such 
illegitimate children are given fairly good care. At the provincial level, special 
institutions take care of orphans and iIlegitimate children whose mothers do 
not wish to raise them. When an unmarried pregnant woman decides not to 
raise her child, she is advised to tell her superior at work of her decision well 
before the time of delivery. The latter arranges for her to "take a vacation" at 
the time of the birth, keeping the matter secret. (The same informant, 
however, concedes that this is only a standard procedure for such a delivery 
of an illegitimate child, but most of the villagers know what is going on.) The 
delivery usually takes place at the clinic of a state orphanage bugawon). The 
clinic does not inquire into the identity of the child's father, and the clinic 
takes full responsibility for the mother's well-being while an obstetrical 
patient. After a period of post-natal care she goes back to work, leaving her 
child behind at the orphanage for four years. Then, after three years at a 
special kindergarten known as aeyugwon, the child is transferred to an 
institution called yujanyo hagwon, a boarding school, for formal education 
up to the secondary level. Children brought up in this way are regarded by 
Communist authorities as a special and desirable kind of "socialist men and 
women," one of the most trusted classes of people. Illegitimate children and 
those abandoned in infancy by their parents have no sense of biological 
bonds with their parents, whom they do not even know, and orphans lack 
parents. It  is quite conceivable that these children have complete faith in and 
loyalty to the state, which has raised and educated them. Upon graduation 
from the boarding school, their future is favored in comparison with that of 
other children. They form a core element in any unit of social and political 
organization to which they are assigned. 
A "campaign against illiteracy" has been vigorously pursued. Within a 
few years after liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the North Korean 
Communists organized a national anti-illiteracy campaign. First, simple 
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courses in reading, writing, and other subjects were set up in every town, 
village, factory, mine, and other production and residential community in 
North Korea. School teachers of various educational levels and local 
government functionaries were mobilized as teachers, as were the village 
intellectuals and students. The schools, which were called "Korean language 
schools," were designed primarily to wipe out illiteracy among the working 
people who had failed to receive formal education under Japanese rule. No 
less than one-half of the entire working force in North Korea is believed to 
have been illiterate at the time Communism took over. These people were 
taught to read and write the Korean language, other basic knowledge, and 
some politics in courses of instruction of two or three hours daily that were 
held after work hours, especially during the slack season of winter (Chang 
Sok-hun 1973:37). 
These "language schools" soon evolved into a well-organized system of 
adult education consisting of "adult school" on the elementary level and 
"adult middle school" on the secondary level. An intensive program of 
additional primary education was conducted for a large number of graduates 
of these schools. This was a one-year program, divided into three classes, 
junior, middle, and senior, of four months each. As early as 1949, 160,000 
working people reportedly had gone through the adult education program 
(ibid.). 
In the 1958 educational reform, adult education was reorganized and 
further developed by setting up "workers' schools" (kulloja haggyo) and 
"workers' middle schools" (kulloja chunghaggyo), each of which took two 
years to complete. These schools provided general education on the primary 
and junior middle school levels for those who lacked formal education, 
without requiring that they leave their jobs. Thus adult education in North 
Korea has gone beyond providing elementary literacy. Within a decade of 
actual operation, the workers' schools on the elementary level reportedly 
became unnecessary and were subsequently abolished in 1967 (ibid.:38). 
Today, workers' middle schools remain as institutions of adult education. 
Every village or residential cluster in the countryside has such a school. In 
addition to providing secondary education, these schools appear to be 
important in ironing out ideological problems through political lessons. 
Whatever its content, adult education in North Korea during the past 
quarter-century appears to have made marked progress in removing 
illiteracy. Today, except for a small portion of the elderly, the population of 
North Korea is literate and has managed to raise its general knowledge at 
least up to that of primary school graduates. 
INDOCTRINATION 
Education is perceived as the most important avenue toward 
revitalization of the socio-cultural system. According to the view of the North 
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Korean leadership, people can be taught to create a satisfactory society in 
which to live, and man is conceived as the independent and willful creator of 
his own history. This anthropocentric view of culture prevails in every aspect 
of North Korean education. 
The major theme of public education appears to be "how to serve the 
people and the state." Education is no longer a prestige symbol for the 
individual or his family. Acceptance in programs of advanced education is 
interpreted as being "called" by the state. The furthering of personal 
interests is entirely irrelevant to the educational system, which is 
systematically planned on a national scale to meet the demands of the 
economy. The skilled workers, technicians, and scientists who are trained 
under the modern educational institutions are placed where needed and 
where they can perform to the best of their abilities. There can be no waste in 
the educational investment of the state. 
For more than five hundred years, Koreans had been captives of Chinese 
culture, particularly Chinese Neo-Confucianism. Although political leaders 
made effective use of the protection afforded by China, the average Korean 
was shackled by Confucianism, knowledge of which was the only avenue 
toward high position. Confucian education in Korea consisted largely of texts 
in Chinese. Although a Korean alphabet had been invented in 1443, it was 
never popularly used among the Korean people during the Yi Dynasty. 
Almost all literary works by Korean scholars were written in Chinese script, 
which was adapted to the Korean language. A common scene in traditional 
Korea was the group of young pupils sitting in front of their teacher in a 
sodang, private school, loudly reciting the Confucian texts from memory. 
When a pupil failed to make progress, the teacher often used physical 
punishment in an effort to stimulate him. There was no alternative to the 
established Chinese interpretation of the Confucian classics. 
Under Japanese colonial rule, these circumstances changed little. 
Teachers remained authoritative figures or disciplinarians. "Cramming" 
continued to prevail. The Japanese colonialists had no interest in promoting 
literacy among Koreans other than to train them to be "practical people" 
capable of performing their assignments well. Article I1 of the Educational 
Ordinance in Korea enacted and promulgated by the Japanese colonial 
government in August 1911 includes the following statement: "The first 
principle of education is to cultivate loyal subjects in accordance with the 
Imperial Rescript on Education" (quoted in Abe 1971:175). The task of 
remolding Koreans into loyal subjects of the emperor and of the Japanese 
Empire was something that could not be done easily. Coercive and cramming 
education proved to be the only way to educate the Koreans under the 
oppressive military rule. In order to carry out a policy of assimilation through 
education, students at all levels were forced to adopt Japanese cultural 
elements unquestioningly while Korean counterparts, notably the Korean 
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language, were set aside or eliminated. With the goal of gaining quick 
reimbursement for educational investments, educational institutions of the 
Japanese were merely training agencies for producing people with practical 
skills. 
As I have noted, under Communism heavy emphasis is placed on 
education aimed at transforming the young into patriotic socialists 
responsible for carrying out the socialist reconstruction. Schools are regarded 
by the Communist authorities as the very basis of the "cultural revolution." 
The principles underlying education at all levels are the integration of 
"theory with practice" and "education with productive labor," and these 
principles are expressed in slogans such as "learn while working" and "work 
while learning." All students above the primary school level are required to 
participate in productive labor as a part of their regular school curricula. 
One of the sharp distinctions from the past is found in teaching 
methods. Unlike the one-sided, passive, cramming education of the past, 
modern practices highly encourage students to participate actively. Classes 
are no longer simply a matter of lectures; the value of learning is seen to come 
in part through class discussion and participation. Classes are frequently 
divided into small groups so that students can help each other, and to 
promote feelings of group responsibility and collectivism. Every indication 
leads us to believe that the North Korean educational system is designed to 
raise the level of knowledge collectively rather than to strive for excellence of 
a few. 
Nationalism prevails in every aspect of North Korean education. Korean 
language and history are highly stressed. Chinese writings were completely 
banned at the outset of Communist rule. Young people brought up under 
Communism do not know Chinese characters and use only the native 
syllabary. In order to fill the gap left by the ban of Chinese characters, a 
number of Korean words have been invented by state linguists to replace the 
Chinese words formerly in use. It is noteworthy that a number of these words 
are quite unintelligible to South Koreans. 
As noted earlier, the teaching of Korean history, particularly recent 
history, appears to be of vital importance in North Korean education, and 
every episode of class conflict and historical misery is exploited. Korea's 
history texts have been rewritten with a strong emphasis on the "negative 
aspects" of her cultural history and on "newly discovered" positive and 
nationalistic aspects. How landlords exploited their tenants, how 
powerholders abused their positions at the expense of the people, and how 
miserable the life of the poor had been-these and similar topics appearing 
in the rewritten history books come up at practically every political and study 
meeting. 
Comparison of present conditions with those of the pre-Communist 
years is the most common theme of education in class consciousness. But the 
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darkness of the past is not the sole matter of concern. As I have also noted 
earlier, efforts have been made to use native elements of culture as symbols of 
cultural identity, such as the native syllabary. Girls and women are 
encouraged to dress in native costumes of chogori (long-sleeved, high-waisted 
jacket) and ch'irna (long skirt, somewhat shorter than in former times) in 
everyday life. (Because of its inconvenience, native clothing of chogori, a 
long-sleeved coat reaching to a little below waist-line, and paji, baggy 
trousers tied at the ankles, is not recommended for men except on special 
occasions outside working hours.) A notable example of "cultural 
reconstruction" is the previously mentioned effort to "restore" traditional 
group dancing, which in the past had been limited to certain regions of the 
country. Ethnographers were assigned to reconstruct traditional dances and 
modify them to fit contemporary life in such a way as to stimulate 
collectivism. Kunjung muyong, group dancing, is an example. Males and 
females of any age form a circle holding hands, and dance while singing a 
song. This form of group dancing is taught in "cultural activity" sessions at 
schools of all levels, and is now institutionalized as a social and political 
activity throughout North Korea for people of all ages. The establishment of 
group dancing was important in fostering increased socializing between the 
sexes and in reducing the generation gap. 
Teaching is highly practice-oriented. Rather than placing heavy 
dependence upon the teacher's lecture alone, methods of teaching require 
that students give lectures in class and participate in supplementary group 
study sessions. In science and technology classes, heavy emphasis is placed on 
experiments and practical training at factories. Sessions on social and 
political education often deal with actual events of history, calling attention 
to the shortcomings of the past and presenting sympathetically the side of the 
proletariat. 
The most powerful technique of indoctrination of the young and the 
entire population in general appears to be what I have earlier called "positive 
use of hatred of the enemy." It opposes entirely the Christian concept of 
loving one's enemies, which North Koreans find unacceptable, regarding it as 
an institutionalized means by which superiors, either individuals or groups, 
exploit their inferiors, Instead they try to teach the young how to retaliate 
effectively. The new ideology may be paraphrased as "whoever strikes you on 
the right cheek, strike him back on both." It is hoped that burning hatred for 
one's enemies will generate socialist patriotism and confidence in the existing 
system. Certain enemies, such as "Japanese militarism" and "U. S. 
imperialism" may be regarded as scapegoats or fictive enemies since they 
pose no direct threats. The following incident shows how "hatred for one's 
enemies" is used as a teaching tool in North Korean schools: 
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A woman teacher from the Tongch'ang People's School in P'anmun County 
encountered the same difficulty in carrying out the task of revolutionary education 
as is experienced by all other teachers in North Korea, where the new generation 
has grown up free of "exploitation" and "suppression." The school is located just 
north of the southern border, where tensions between North and South Korea 
have existed since the division of Korea. Although this location helped to maintain 
a feeling of hostility toward "enemies," the teacher found that the absence on the 
part of the young of actual experience in the "negative aspects" of the cultural 
history caused her difficulty in educating them in Communist ideology. She had 
tried lectures on such subjects as "How badly the landlords had exploited the 
peasants" and "U. S. imperialism: the unpardonable enemy of the Korean 
people." But her students did not seem to get the point. At last, she found that her 
teaching was more effective when she made use of specially prepared paintings as 
references. One which proved to be most effective was a series of paintings entitled 
"Uncle Shin Chong-ch'ol's Yesterday and Today." It depicts a poor boy named 
Shin Chong-ch'oI who was made to slave for a landlord and who was often 
physically abused by his master. In addition, as part of the regular school 
curriculum, she often organized "meetings to curse the enemy, U. S. 
imperialism." At times, sham battles between two groups of students proved to be 
an effective way of developing a sense of hatred for external enemies and of 
promoting comradeship among the students. (Rodoltg Sinmun, 3/27/71, p. 6) 
Not even mathematics classes are free of hostility toward one's enemies. 
Students are asked to work out their mathematics lessons "in the same spirit 
as they curse their enemies," and are given questions such as the following: 
After two hours of pursuit of a runaway spy, a member of Young Pioneers Corps 
who runs four kilometers per hour and a security agent who runs eight kilometers 
per hour arrested him. How far did the boy and the security agent run to catch the 
spy? (Ibid.) 
We find abundant evidence of hostility toward foreign powers, especially 
the United States. The most graphic is an eyewitness report of a twenty-eight- 
year-old South Korean Christian missionary who was among the passengers 
of a South Korean airplane hijacked in December 1969 by a North Korean 
sympathizer who was reportedly a Communist agent, and who sixty-five 
days later was released in North Korea. The missionary reported that 
"Everywhere we went, we saw effigies of Uncle Sam with legs torn away. 
On the effigies were signs, 'Let's tear off the legs of U. S. imperialists!' At 
one time, I saw children bayoneting an effigy of an American GI." He went 
on to say, "It was a fearful society. Death to Americans! Death to South 
Koreans! That was the North Korea I visited" (quoted in Shim 1970:17). A 
similar observation is reported by H. Edward Kim (1974:271), a National 
Geographic staff member, who, on a visit to North Korea for twenty days in 
the fall of 1973, saw at a day-care center in Songnim a grim poster that 
depicted patriotic tots shooting a "U. S. imperialist monster." 
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According to the North Korean publication Kulloja (Workers) (October 
1964, p. 6), the spirit of "hatred of class enemies" is inseparable from the 
passionate love for one's own people (comradeship) and the two together 
form the essence of "Communist humanism." The idea that people's 
awareness of their enemies, both within and outside their nation, can 
promote effective organization appears to pervade programs of education 
and indoctrination. It seems reasonable to say that criticism of alleged 
enemies has been firmly institutionalized as an essential part of the North 
Korean way of life as a way of validating the nation's path of revolution. 
One of the most difficult tasks of indoctrinating the younger generation 
in Communist ideology has already been noted in another context. Almost 
three decades have passed since the establishment of the Communist regime, 
and the new generation has had no actual experience with the conditions of 
pre-Communist years and of the period of the Korean War. Efforts have been 
made to preserve the wounds of the past and to use them in educating the 
young. Numerous museums and memorials have been established for this 
purpose, and these are an essential part of educational programs. Visitors to 
North Korea have been impressed by the efforts of this kind to preserve the 
past, often in exaggerated form. Examples include the Museum of the 
Korean Revolution (Hyongmyong Pangmulgwan), Ethnological Museum 
(Minsok Pangmulgwan), Museum of Fine Arts (Misul Pangrnulgwan), 
Museum of History (Yoksa Pangmulgwan), Memorial of the Foundation of 
the Korean Workers' Party (Tang Ch'anggon Kinyomgwan), and Memorial 
of the War of the Liberation of the Fatherland (Chogug Haebang-jonjaeng 
Kinyomgwan). 
The Ethnological Museum serves as an illustration of the nature of these 
institutions (extracted from Choson chungang nyon 'gam, or Korean Central 
Yearbook, 1973:264-266). This museum was founded in early 1956 and was 
reorganized in 1970 as a museum to record the "revolutionary and 
Communist way of life during the years of struggle for independence under 
Japanese colonial rule." Its exhibition rooms are divided into three parts, the 
first of which concerns the life of soldiers (guerillas). Detailed exhibits show 
the life of the guerillas, their quarters, military training, and other organized 
activities, and their ethical code. These exhibits use models, actual objects, 
photographs, and paintings. Another room exhibits foods eaten by the 
guerillas and illustrates their problems of health. The third room consists of 
exhibits about the lives of boys and girls during that period. 
In addition to the museums and memorials on the national level, 
numerous small institutions of similar kind have been set up throughout the 
country. Student tours are arranged to these places as part of the regular 
school curriculum. Each year, especially during summer vacation, the Young 
Pioneers Corps, which includes all children between nine and thirteen years 
of age, organizes camping trips to historical sites such as old battlefields and 
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sites related to anti-Japanese guerilla activities. At these places, campers and 
other visitors are conducted on tours by professional guides, usually women, 
who explain the historic events in rather detailed and often highly 
dramatized ways. A night meeting called udungbul-moim, or bonfire 
meeting, is often held during the camping trips, which consists of a politically 
oriented educational program conducted while campers sit around a bonfire. 
Usually the program consists of readings from an official text called 
"Memoirs of the Anti-Japanese Guerillas" and of patriotic poems, the 
singing of revolutionary songs, and listening to a lecture by an invited guest 
who relates experiences in opposing the Japanese. North Korean leaders 
appear to regard such education carried on outside the classrooms as making 
a great contribution to the campaign of indoctrination. 
Efforts have been made to root out all possible sources of factionalism, 
which is regarded as one of the worst of the "enemies." It  had been common 
in traditional Korea for graduates of the same school or persons from the 
same locality to form factions within larger groups. Seniors and juniors in 
schools then often formed factions, and under Japanese rule these conditions 
continued to exist. In secondary schools, juniors were expected to obey their 
seniors. When they passed on the street, they exchanged military salutes, 
initiated by the juniors. Failure to salute often led to informal disciplinary 
action by the seniors. 
Under the modern system of compulsory education all young people 
attend school and there is no difference among students based upon 
seniority. Graduation from a specific school does not have any prestigious 
meaning, and dominance based upon seniority of age and class in school is 
discouraged. Students are to refer to each other as tongmu, comrade, and are 
to treat each other as equals, Students still wear badges identifying their 
school and their class; now, however, the student who first sees another 
student, his junior or senior, is supposed to initiate a salute, which has 
become a gesture of comradely greeting. Students in junior middle school 
formally belong to the Young Pioneers Corps and have a distinctive salute, a 
raising of the right hand above the left side of the head while exchanging 
greetings with such phrases as "Be prepared (Chunbi-haja)" or "Be prepared 
at all times (Hangsang-jztnbi)," phrases that are reminiscent of the Boy 
Scouts. The phrases are taken from the Young Pioneers' oath of "Let's be 
prepared at all times to serve as the Communist second reservists." All 
students of senior middle school are members of the Socialist Working Youth 
League. Unlike the Young Pioneers, they use a military salute which is often 
accompanied by comradely verbal greetings such as Annyong-hasimnika 
(How are you?) or Tangyol-haja (Let us unite!). 
As the preceding descriptions suggest, one of the underlying principles 
of North Korean education seems to be the fostering of interdependence or 
comradeship. From an early age, the young are brought up under chojik- 
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saenghwal, or "organizational life." Beyond the family, a child is a member 
of a school, the Young Pioneers Corps or the Socialist Working Youth 
League, study groups, and other special activity groups. As a member of 
these groups, he is asked to strive toward the best interests of the group and 
the society as a whole. An individual's efforts in behalf of society are not 
simply respected but are glorified. North Korean school texts of the primary 
and secondary schools are filled with stories of revolutionary heroes and 
heroines, the self-sacrifices of patriots, and brave resistance to the Japanese 
colonialists. 
2. Religion under Communism 
Since the Communists assumed control in North Korea, they have 
carried out systematically and vigorously a campaign against religion that is 
not consistent with officially declared policy regarding religion. Freedom of 
religion is supposedly guaranteed by the North Korean Constitution, but 
numerous examples of anti-religious activities appear in official North 
Korean documents. Article 14 of the old Constitution, which was adopted by 
the Supreme People's Assembly at its first session on September 8, 1948, 
states: "Citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall have the 
freedom of religious belief and of conducting religious services." Despite this 
constitutional provision, strong opposition to organized religion has existed, 
As we saw earlier, for example, property owned by religious organizations 
was confiscated during the land reform. 
An official interpretation of the Constitution delivered at the Kim 11- 
sung University (Kim 11-sung Chonghap Taehak 196055; also quoted in Cho 
1965:ll) puts the circumstances in this way: "The freedom of religion is the 
freedom to believe or not to believe in any religious creed or to conduct any 
religious ceremony. It also includes the freedom to disseminate anti-religious 
propaganda" (my translation; emphasis added). Another excerpt from this 
text states: "At present, various religious groups engage freely in their 
activities without any interference. Members of the groups (chonggyoin), like 
other ordinary people, participate in various fields such as government, 
politics, economy, and social life without disciimination" (my translation; 
emphasis added). Again, declaration and actual practice do not agree. 
This de facto trend of opposition to religion was later formally 
incorporated in the Constitution. Article 54 of the "Socialist Constitution" 
revised and adopted on December 17, 1972, reads: "Citizens have religious 
liberty and the freedom to oppose religion." (The latter was phrased as "the 
freedom of anti-religious propaganda" in its official translation. See Foreign 
Broadcast Service 1972: D4-D20, for an English text of the Constitution.) 
The right to perform religious services of one's choice was in fact completely 
denied by governmental authority. Church facilities were made into public 
nurseries and kindergartens, and in some cases were used as quarters to 
house local administrative bodies and political organizations. 
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The North Korean policy of opposing Christianity can be better 
understood if the history of Christianity in northern Korea is reviewed. Until 
the end of Japanese colonial rule, Christianity had grown more rapidly in 
northern Korea than in the southern half of the nation, where Confucianism 
had been much stronger. Wealth and power were concentrated in the south. 
There were numerous Confucian strongholds in the south, but only a few in 
the north. Thus, Christianity met strong resistance in the south but a 
relatively easy acceptance in the north. During pre-Communist years, 
P'yongyang, now the capital of North Korea, had been the most prominent 
center of Christianity in Korea. One-sixth of the city's population of 300,000 
were Christians when northern Korea became a Communist state. The 
Christian churches had also been important in efforts to gain independence 
from Japan. Ironically, when Korea won independence from Japan, the 
Christians of the North had to face a much stronger struggle for survival. 
Some organized attempts were made by Christian groups to protest against 
Communist persecution, but these activities were ruthlessly suppressed. 
Christian missionaries introduced much Western culture to Korea, 
including innovations in formal education and in medicine. Since the 
missionaries had approached the Korean people largely by means of roles 
connected with education, many Korean intellectuals became Christians, 
especially in northern Korea. When northern Korea became Communist, its 
Christians became social outcasts. Since the majority were of the middle or 
upper class, their survival was immediately threatened because of their 
relative wealth and additionally threatened because of their religious 
identification. A great exodus of Christians to South Korea occurred during 
the first five years of independence, until the outbreak of the Korean War. 
This trend rose to a climax when the Allied Forces reached their most 
northerly point. Millions of northerners then fled to the south. Today in 
South Korea most of the prominent figures of the Christian churches are of 
northern origin and the refugees form the core of the Christian groups. 
The exodus of Christians from 1945 to 1953 appears to have been 
advantageous to the new regime. Christians soon became so few that 
organized resistance by them to Communist policies was not possible. 
Although numerous incidents of resistance from Christians did take place at 
the time of land reform before the war, the later cooperativization of 
agriculture was carried out with no notabIe signs of resistance from the 
remaining Christian population. How the Christians remaining in North 
Korea might have fared under Communist rule is unclear for lack of 
information. I t  is certain that the Christian population was very substantially 
reduced by movement to South Korea, but it is hard to believe that there are 
no longer any Christians in North Korea, as the North Korean propaganda 
repeatedly claims. According to my informants, hardly any signs of the 
existence of Christianity are evident in North Korea. Group activities of 
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Christians are strictly forbidden. The informants do think it possible that 
Christianity may survive secretly, however. When a Japanese visitor asked 
one of his hosts in North Korea about the fate of Christianity in North Korea, 
he received the following reply: 
Certainly there is no Christian church in the city of P'yongyang. One can find not 
a single church anywhere in the country. There remain some Buddhist temples in 
the mountains, but they are expected to be gone soon. In the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, neither Christianity nor Buddhism is prohibited. 
The freedom of religious belief is guaranteed. However, no matter how 
faithfully one prays to God, one cannot get food to eat and a dwelling to live in 
from him. When one works hard under the Guidance of Premier Kim 11-sung, 
there is not the slightest fear of scarcity of food, clothing and housing. For this 
reason, it is quite natural to see the decrease of Christians. (Wada 1963:22; my 
translation) 
North Korean Communism has had little trouble with Buddhism. Under 
the shadow of the more powerful Confucianism during the era of the Yi 
Dynasty, Buddhism in Korea never recovered the strength it had once held, 
particularly during the Koryo (935-1392) era. Unlike the circumstances in 
other east Asian countries, Buddhism had never become deeply entrenched 
in Korean life. Pushed to positions of obscurity by the dominant 
Confucianism, most of the Buddhist temples in Korea are located in the 
mountains, a sign of isolation from the daily life of the people. Except for 
some faithful Buddhists who paid occasional visits to the temples to pray, it 
was difficult to find any notable Buddhist cultural elements in community 
life before the Communist era. Unlike Christianity, Buddhist identification 
has not always been clear. Villagers, mostly women, did often attend special 
ceremonies in the temples and contribute a handful of grain to Buddhist 
monks making pilgrimages. They did not maintain close relationships with 
Buddhist temples in their daily lives, however, and Buddhism did not 
concern the important events of their lifespans. 
Weakened Korean Buddhism caused little stir when northern Korea 
came under Communist rule. The Buddhist temples were put to secular 
public use, except some famous temples that were designated as "cultural 
treasures." In many cases, the monks are allowed to remain at  their temples 
as caretakers. The weakness of Korean Buddhism was also evident in the 
absence of Buddhist reaction when the temples were taken over. Except for 
information on the confiscation of landholdings of the temples, the North 
Korean documents have not recorded much information on the fate of 
Buddhism itself. It appears to have placed few social obstacles in the path of 
Communism. 
Since the end of the Korean War, the North Korean government has 
given considerable effort to rooting out traditiona1 religious elements from 
everyday life, beliefs and acts that might be called folk religion. Traditionally 
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the majority of Koreans had believed in many gods, to whom they appealed 
for aid in solving life's problems, and scientific interpretations of the universe 
were little known by the average person. Although suppression of the 
organized religions was carried out with relative ease, the task of "getting rid 
of the remnants of backward ideology7' inherited from the old society has 
been more difficult. Accomplishing this task has been a target of the 
"ideological revolution," through the education system and propaganda 
networks. Indoctrination in the new view was conducted through 
publications, movies, plays, circle activities, and series of lectures. 
The anti-religious campaign dealt a heavy blow to religious practitioners 
of all kinds, including fortune-tellers (chomjaeng'i) and sorceresses (mu- 
dang),who were formerly numerous. Members of the Korea-China Friendship 
Cooperative Farm, for example, were reported to include several former 
fortune-tellers and sorceresses who had left their old profession entirely 
(Hwang et al. 1960:209). The campaign against religion is carried out 
principally by the young, particularly through the organizational networks of 
the Socialist Working Youth League and the Women's League. According to 
one of my informants, some religious practitioners were earnestly requested 
to abandon their old profession by young members of their own families. 
During the early stage of the campaign, young people often destroyed the 
facilities and paraphernalia of the practitioners of supernaturalism in their 
villages. 
Despite the energetic campaign, deep-rooted beliefs in supernaturalism 
were not erased as easily as the Communist leaders had expected. 
Documentary sources describe many instances in which elements of 
supernaturalism survived more than a decade of Communism. According to 
Chong Ha-ch'ol(1959:28-31), in localities which suffered prolonged drought 
some people performed rain ceremonies. Although dispensaries and 
hospitals were available, some people still had recourse to supernaturalism, 
performing traditional rites of curing that involved offerings. Such people 
were publicly criticized for wasting their property, and held to blame because 
their illnesses became worse or even fatal without the aid of scientific 
therapy. Chong (ibid.) states that a few people continue to believe in the 
"divine favor of God." 
Traditionally, the cause of illness was often thought to be evil forces. 
Modern scientific theories of pathogenesis appear not to have been readily 
accepted by the aged. According to one informant who observed the 
circumstances he describes, until the early 1960s some elderly people who 
had suffered misfortunes such as illness among their children prayed and 
made offerings to supernatural beings. The same informant, who had served 
as an intelligence officer on a farm, was once told that a sterile woman had 
secretly gone into the mountains and prayed to the "mountain god" for a 
child. Under Communist rule such magico-religious practices of medicine 
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now appear to have been almost wiped out. The presence of specialists in 
modern medicine on each farm has brought to everyone modern medical 
knowIedge, which, together with the activities of the campaign against 
supernaturalism, has seriously weakened if not entirely obliterated the 
traditional beliefs. 
In the past, rituals related to death were highly elaborate and complex, 
and were drawn chiefly from Confucianism. As might be expected, the degree 
of elaboration correlated with the socio-economic statuses of the families 
concerned. Today, these customs have been greatly simplified and changed 
in other ways that accord with modern conditions of life. Funerals were 
traditionally a matter of concern chiefly to the kin of the deceased. Various 
rites were performed exclusively by lineage members, and unrelated 
neighbors only contributed labor to aid the bereaved family for a fixed period 
of a few days and attended the funeral to pay their respects to the deceased. 
Kinsmen tended to reside in the same village or neighboring villages, and 
funerals and later commemorative rites were important in bringing them 
together, thus promoting solidarity among lineage members. Today, kinsmen 
are spread widely over the country, and elaborate funerals are discouraged by 
many other circumstances that have already been described. 
As we have observed, the new work organizations have taken over many 
of the traditional functions of kinship including observances at  death. When 
one of its members dies, a work team performs such necessary tasks as 
transporting the coffin and making a grave. Close relatives living in the same 
village are, of course, more actively involved in funeral activities than other 
people. Relatives in other localities are not usually informed of the death and 
they are discouraged from attending the simple rites. In general, the 
traditional spirit of giving mutual assistance at times of death appears to 
remain intact and some of the old ceremonial events continue to be observed. 
Neighbors contribute to the household of mourning certain amounts of food, 
including cooked rice and rice-gruel mixed with red beans (pp'atchuk), to be 
consumed by those who give aid in the funeral. Representatives of each 
family of the village make a visit of condolence to the bereaved family. The 
funeral is usually held on the second day after the death, as in the past. Many 
old ritual elements of the funeral have been either dropped or simplified. 
Traditionally, the funeral procession included a small sedan-chair, 
supposedly housing the soul of the dead, which was carried by two men 
proceeding ahead of the hearse. Today, no sedan-chair is used; instead a man 
walks ahead of the hearse carrying a framed photograph of the deceased; if 
no photograph is available, this part of the rite is omitted. The traditional 
funeral procession was headed by a man bearing a pennant on which the 
dead man's name was written. This pennant was followed by a number of 
others contributed by relatives and friends as expressions of condolence. 
Traditionally the number of pennants was an index of the power and prestige 
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of the family of the deceased. Only the pennant identifying the deceased is 
used today. Other deletions include funeral songs, which were formerly sung 
by the bearers of the hearse. 
It  is interesting to note, however, that the custom of consulting a 
geomancer to determine a lucky location for a grave is still followed if a 
geomancer is available. There are no professional geomancers in North 
Korea today, but an elderly amateur who has some knowledge of geomancy 
may be consulted. How much credence is given to this geomancy is uncertain, 
but following the old custom clearly appears to provide some kind of 
psychological satisfaction. 
Traditionally, the period of mourning was two years, during which the 
bereaved relatives should live austerely. During this period relatives of the 
deceased, usually the household of the eldest son, maintained an elaborate 
memorial room calledpinso specially set up to house the soul of the dead, 
which was ritually brought back to the house after the burial of the corpse. 
The pinso has survived but in a very simple form. A framed photograph of 
the dead and two candles placed on the table are the only noteworthy items in 
the room, and elaborate offerings of food are no longer made. The memorial 
room is usually dismantled on the second day after the funeral. Thereafter, 
the family returns to normal life. 
During the early part of the Communist rule, a campaign was waged 
against ancestral worship, primarily directed toward Confucianism. The 
campaign seemingly met strong opposition, and subsequently, in 1966, 
efforts to denounce ancestral worship ended. No efforts were made to 
encourage this practice, however. The Communist regime seems to have 
taken the position that it will allow the people to cling to the tradition of 
ancestor worship, so long as it does not interfere with efforts toward 
economic development. 
Various additional remnants of the elaborate ceremonial complex of 
traditional Korea also survive. The custom of holding commemorative 
services is still observed by many people. On the first and second 
anniversaries of a death, a mourning ceremony is held in the house of the 
eldest son, where villagers, friends, and close relatives pay their last respects 
to the dead. Those who attend the ceremony bring gifts, usually a bottle of a 
non-alcoholic drink made of fruits. Close relatives who Iive far away may not 
attend the first anniversary ceremony, but they generally try to join their 
relatives in the second, when the mourning period formally comes to an end. 
The traditional wailing of mourners is still heard at funerals and also during 
the mourning ceremonies. 
After the mourning period of two years, descendants of the deceased 
perform a memorial ceremony each year. Unlike mourning ceremonies, the 
annual memorial ceremonies are performed exclusively by kin, as in the past. 
Most families perform the ceremonies only for the parents of the male head 
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of the family, but a few people continue to conduct rites for ancestors of the 
household head as far back as great-great-grandparents. Still other families 
perform no memorial ceremonies. It is doubtful that the memorial 
ceremonies still function effectively to promote unity among large groups of 
kin since participation by many relatives is now difficult or impossible. Some 
people arrange to take their annual vacation of fourteen days (in addition to 
the national holidays) at times that allow them to attend family memorial 
ceremonies as well as to see their relatives. Generally, however, memorial 
ceremonies are performed by only small groups of kin who live near each 
other. 
No basic changes are evident in the procedures of the ceremonies. Foods 
are still offered and the rites usually take place after midnight, the 
traditional time. The ways in which ceremonial foods are placed on the table 
and the use of incense and candles are also basically the same as in the past. 
No incense is especially made for ceremoniaI use in North Korea today. The 
wood of the Chinese juniper has long been burned as incense, however, and 
one of my informants states that since this wood is used in making pencils, 
obtaining it for ceremonial use is not a problem. 
In the past the center of ritual observances of mourning and memorial 
ceremonies was an ancestral tablet, a piece of wood on which was inscribed 
information about the deceased including name, official title, and the date of 
death. During the first two years after death, the tablet was placed on a 
ceremonial table in the memorial room (pinso). Afterwards, the tablet was 
placed either in a closet in the living room or in the ancestor hall, a special 
room that was usually in the rear of the main building of the residence. 
Among prominent lineages, the ancestor hall was the symbol of power and 
prestige. At each memorial ceremony, the tablets of ancestors were brought 
to the ceremonial hall by the members of the family concerned. The average 
family did not have an ancestor hall, and the tablets for their ancestors were 
made of paper, prepared for each ceremonial occasion and burned after the 
ceremony. According to one informant, some people still use the paper 
tablets during the rites for ancestors. The inscription on the tablet is the 
traditional one, written in Chinese and in the Confucian manner, The 
survival of this custom is surprising since, as I have noted, both Chinese 
writing and Confucianism have been banned. Young people cannot write 
Chinese characters and the elderly prepare the tablets. So far as my 
informant knows, no ancestral tablets are inscribed with the Korean 
syllaba~y. 
It  seems evident that even ancestor worship has been put to Communist 
use. As noted earlier, memorial ceremonies were exclusively kinsmen's 
affairs. (It should be observed in passing that priests had no roles in funerals 
and memorial services.) The trend under Communism, which is still 
incipient, however, seems to put ancestor worship into a different mold. 
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Village leaders and cadre members may attend the ceremonies, and, 
although the actual ceremonial acts are performed by kin of the deceased, 
these non-kin who attend participate in eating ceremonial foods after the 
formalized rites have ended. The gathering is then made into an opportunity 
for giving political education and ideological indoctrination. Of course, the 
subject of the meeting is reminiscences of the deceased; talk is said often to 
move to the topics of "the difficult life under the Japanese colonial rule," and 
"happiness under the present Communist rule." Anyone, kin or non-kin, 
who knew the deceased well presents eulogies. In the eulogies, an attempt is 
made to teach the young what went wrong in the past and what should be 
done in order not to repeat the "evils of the past." People whose ancestors 
have been classified as enemies of the people or the exploiting class do not 
conduct memorial rites, since they have been made to feel ashamed of what 
their ancestors have done. Instead, as I have noted, many of these people 
try publicly to denounce and dissociate themselves from their ancestors. The 
new trend of participation in the memorial rites by non-kinsmen may be 
summed up as a syncretic blend of the traditional ancestral worship and 
Communist ideological indoctrination that contributes toward the weakening 
of the importance of kin relationships and of solidarity among kinsmen. 
The intrusion of non-kin into what had formerly been exclusively kin 
affairs is seen also in mourning customs. Mourning dress was worn by all 
tangnae members, that is, the common descendants of the great-great- 
grandparents, although there were distinctions in the elaboration of 
mourning costumes according to the degree of consanguineal relationship 
with the deceased. Today, my informants advise, mourning dresses are worn 
only by lineal descendants, that is, children and grandchildren, and not by 
collateral or affinal relatives, who wear a mourning hat only. Close friends of 
the deceased also wear mourning hats at the funeral, a new custom. Since the 
local descent group is no longer an effective unit of social organization and 
relatives tend to be scattered geographically, bonds with the deceased are 
weak or do not exist among many of his kin. This circumstance may have 
made the nuclear family more important than formerly to any individual and 
also may have made important the social networks among the non-kinsmen 
in daily life. 
The traditional custom of songmyo, or visiting ancestral tombs, remains 
an annual event. On Moon Festival Day (August 15th of the lunar calendar), 
relatives gather and pay homage at their ancestral graves, cutting the grass in 
the graveyard and performing a simple ceremony. Since the visits take place 
on a fixed day, the government often provides transportation for the visitors, 
mobilizing all the vehicles available (Kawagoe 1970:152). There seems to be 
no intention on the part of the government to discourage or prohibit this 
traditional custom. Like Moon Festival Day, various other traditional 
ceremonies continue to follow the ancient lunar calendar. All other time 
reckoning follows the Gregorian calendar. 
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The efforts of the Communist government to sort out and preserve 
native cultural elements extend to customs relating to the dead. In the past, 
the dead were usually buried. Cremation, a custom that apparently came 
with Buddhism, was not widely accepted until the era of Japanese rule, when 
numerous crematories were built. The Communists closed all the crematories 
and required interment of the bodies of the dead in cemeteries. Each local 
administrative unit has its own public cemetery. In some areas where no 
public cemetery is readily available the families of people who have died may 
choose sites for interment in the old ancestral graveyards. Unless they 
obstruct governmental plans for use of land, the old lineage graveyards are 
not disturbed without the approval of the descendants of those whose 
remains are buried there. 
If all of the policies of the Communist government regarding religion are 
examined, a strong trend toward suppression of supernaturalism and 
organized religion is evident. This trend has strong bearing on values and 
customs concerning kinship, and these traditional ways have also been 
strongly discouraged insofar as they apply to large kin groups. Certain of the 
old customs associated with ancestors continue to be observed, with at least 
tacit official approval, apparently because they appear to be emotionally 
important to the people and do not oppose governmental aims. Other old 
customs have been used or modified to suit the ideology of Communism. 
3. Integration: A Family-State 
In totalitarian societies, people who do not accept leadership are 
generally subjected to ruthless persecution, and a power struggle continues 
until a pecking order is established and one leader comes to absolute power. 
The political process in North Korea was not an exception. After more than a 
quarter of a century of Communist rule, President Kim 11-sung rose to the 
position of "superstar" (Munthe-Kaas 1972:26-27). A Japanese visitor to 
North Korea (Wada 1963:23) stated, somewhat jokingly, that there is no need 
for other gods in North Korea, since they have their own god, Kim 11-sung. 
Economist Joan Robinson (1965:548), who visited North Korea in October 
1964, similarly stated that Kim 11-sung functioned as a "messiah rather than 
a dictator." Scholars of North Korea generally share this impression, seeing 
Kim as the center of a cult. To outside observers, the cult is often seen as a 
fanatic, conscious attempt to create strong leadership that is generated by a 
small inner circle of people holding political power. The extent to which the 
cult has effectively permeated people's lives in North Korea, however, leads 
me to believe that this interpretation is too simple, and that additional 
factors are involved. 
It appears that the cult has evolved to the point where President Kim is 
literally worshipped by the people of North Korea. From the time a baby first 
begins to talk it is indoctrinated with the image of the "Great Leader 
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Comrade Kim." Children are told by their teachers that the food they #receive 
in the nursery is provided by him, and are explicitly taught to be thankful for 
his grace. At mealtimes, nursery teachers demand that each child say 
"Thank you, Great Leader" before food is given to him. Reinforcement of 
this image-building continues throughout the years of schooling. All tangible 
things that supposedly related to Kim in the past are revered and are well 
preserved as historical objects. His birthplace, for example, has become a 
national shrine, and numerous statues of him have been erected throughout 
the nation. 
An examination of North Korean documentary materials, particularly 
Rodong Sinmun (Workers' Daily), the organ of the North Korean Workers' 
Party, shows that during the second half of the 1960s the Kim cult was 
gradually intensified. Idolatrous descriptions of Kim 11-sung began to appear 
at this time, of which the following are examples: "the sun of the nation . . . 
whom revoIutionary people of the world adore so ardently as 'the hero of the 
20th century produced by Korea,' " and "the greatest, most respected and 
beloved leader produced by the whole world" (Munthe-Kaas 1972:27). In the 
1960s, after the completion of agricultural cooperativization, Kim is reported 
to have made numerous personal, "on-the-spot" inspections of rural 
enterprises. One of the most publicized personal tours by Kim was made to 
Ch'ongsalli Cooperative Farm in February 1960. This visit resulted in a new 
socialist system of economic management known as the "Chongsanri 
[Ch'ongsalli] method" and the "Chongsanri spirit." In Kim's own words 
(1971:95; official English text published in P'yongyang), "The essence of the 
Chongsanri [Ch'ongsalli] method lies in the facts that the upper organs help 
the lower, superiors help their inferiors, priority is given to political work and 
the masses are roused to carry out their revolutionary tasks." The frequent 
contact between Kim and the farmers through his visits of inspection has 
doubtless been important in the development of the Kim cult. It is most 
likely that the events of any on-the-spot inspection by the President have been 
well planned so that the actual visit is only to play them out. These 
inspections have made a tremendous impact on the workers' morale, since 
personal contact with a supreme leader is a privilege of which they had never 
dreamed. If their farm operates well, the farmers undoubtedly develop a 
sense of loyalty to their leader and give him their support. 
It is interesting to compare these modern circumstances with certain 
Confucian ideas of pre-Communist Korea. Among the five cardinal human 
relationships which form the core of Confucianism, the father-son relation- 
ship and the ruler-subject relationship are especially relevant. We have seen 
that the father-son relationship had become the principal one and that the 
ruler-subject relationship was not a strongly integrative factor in Korean 
society. Considerable emphasis was placed on the relationship among kin 
who were united in lines of descent from common ancestors. Among the 
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members of the privileged class, identification with powerful lineages was 
often the key to success in life. Although Korea had been a country of a single 
race and language for a millenium, it had long been socially divided into 
numerous nuclei of lineages, and no means of penetrating the walIs of 
kinship existed that would integrate the entire population into a single, tight 
national network. 
Under Communism, the father-son relationship continues to be 
important. Filial piety remains a virtue and those who fail to serve their 
parents or parents-in-law properly are subjected to public criticism. The 
father-son relationship and other bonds of kinship have nevertheless been 
substantially weakened in line with economic and sociological changes, as 
earlier discussion of such subjects as property, inheritance, marital 
relationships, lineages, and economic activities has brought out. The 
weakening of kinship alone implies changes in the social order which are 
revolutionary, 
The formerly weak relationship between ruler and subject, however, has 
gained considerable strength under Communist rule in the form of the cult of 
personality centered around Kim 11-sung. How was such a transformation 
possible in such a short period of time? This question may be answered if we 
consider the strengthening of the ruler-subject relationship as an extension of 
the father-son relationship. I suggest that the weakening of the importance of 
kinship, particularly the father-son relationship, would have caused serious 
social disturbance unless a strongly integrative mechanism were developed as 
a substitute. The use of the old as a model for the new has served effectively. 
The socio-political chaos and the sense of personal deprivation that came as 
an aftermath of the war, and the many subsequent changes in ways of life, 
paved the way for the rise of a messianic figure to unite the people. Since the 
Korean War, North Korean society has been a closed system, sealed off from 
foreign cultural influences. (With regard to cultural contacts with other 
socialist countries, Russia and China in particular, North Korea may not be 
regarded as a completely "closed system." Complete control by the central 
government over mass communications and any other possible channel of 
transmission of cultural traits, however, keeps ordinary people from foreign 
cultural influences, even from Russian and Chinese cultures, except only 
segments which are regarded as of positive value to North Korea's own socio- 
cultural system.) The people were left with no feasible alternative than to 
adjust to changed conditions; and for most people, the changes represented 
an improvement in living conditions, a circumstance which led them to give 
credit for the improvement to their leader. 
Two of the most celebrated achievements under Communist rule are 
noteworthy in connection with the Kim cult. These are the abolition of the 
agricultural tax-in-kind, and the establishment of the ten-year program of 
compulsory education, which occurred in 1966 and 1972, respectively. The 
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agricultural tax-in-kind was first imposed in 1946, as one of the major 
sources of internal revenue. With the abolition of this tax, farmers were freed 
of taxes. Profit from the industrial sector then supposedly became the sole 
source of internal revenue of the national government. Of course, there is no 
doubt that the government does indirectly collect revenue from the rural 
sector in the process of exchanging industrial goods for agricultural produce, 
but the formal abolition of tax-in-kind itself had great impact on the farmers' 
morale. The policy regarding purchase and supply of rice has also been a 
factor in boosting the morale of both farmers and workers. According to Kim 
11-sung, who was interviewed at P'yongyang by Governor Minobe of Tokyo 
(1972:50), the government procurement agency purchases rice from farmers 
at sixty-five chon (about fifty cents) per kilogram and supplies it to urban 
residents at eight chon per kilogram. These figures were confirmed by my 
informants. There is no doubt that this policy brings about a sense of 
confidence in their government and its leaders among both producers and 
consumers. Similarly, the establishment of the ten-year system of universal 
compulsory education, which is far beyond what the peasant class could 
afford for its children in the past, has won for President Kim the popular 
support of the working people. 
All the progress made under Communist rule has been interpreted as 
the result of President Kim's "wise leadership," an interpretation that 
resembles the pre-Communist custom of attributing personal success in life 
to one's ancestors. Any kind of state assistance is called a gift from the 
"respected and beloved leader" Kim, and it is common practice to speak of 
his deeds in terms of paternal love. The new strength of the ruler-subject 
relationship appears to be a projection of the old father-son relationship in a 
new social context. Without a long history of social arrangements in which 
kinship was vitally important, it seems unlikely that the modern conditions of 
integration based upon a sense of paternalism could have been achieved. 
Kim 11-sung has in fact become a cultural hero who is referred to by the 
people as "father." The Confucian conception of filial piety referred to 
paternal love in terms of "indebtedness as high as a mountain and deep as an 
ocean." It is interesting to note that recently the expression "indebtedness to 
the President Kim 11-sung as high as a mountain and deep as an ocean" is 
frequently seen in contemporary North Korean publications (Rodong 
Sinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3 ;  3/10/68, p. 2; 1/28/69, p. 2; 6/1/69, p. 2; 
2/25/70, p. 5; and 2/12/71, p. 4). Young people increasingly tend to identify 
themselves as "sons and daughters of the Korean Workers' Party and 
Marshal Kim 11-sung." The celebrated woman track athlete Shin Kom-dan 
publicly stated "how proud and happy she was to be a daughter of the 
Korean Workers' Party and Marshal Kim 11-sung'' at the time she won the 
400 and 800 meter competitions of the International Track and Field 
Competition in Moscow (Choson Nyosong, August 1961:30). Her real father 
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lives in South Korea, where he fled during the Korean War, but she is 
regarded by North Koreans as a folk heroine because she has proved her 
loyalty to the regime through hard work. 
What is important here is the fact that loyalty to the supreme Ieader 
supersedes the traditional concept of filial piety to biological parents. 
Farmers and other workers work harder today. Of course, material gain 
should not be disregarded as a motivating factor; however, it is noteworthy 
that participation in the socialist construction is interpreted as repayment of 
the indebtedness people owe to their "respected and beloved leader." In 
recent years, the North Korean mass media have carried an increasing 
number of accounts of exemplary activities of young people arising from their 
sense of duty to the state and the supreme leader. Feelings of loyalty to the 
modern leader seem, in fact, to be considerably stronger than the traditional 
virtue of filial piety. The very mode of integration through deification of the 
supreme leader leads us to believe that Confucianism, strongly denounced by 
the North Korean Communists, has survived in transmuted form. The 
change is a shift in the principle of social organization from familism based 
on the father-son relationship to primacy of the ruler-subject relationship, so 
that integration extends beyond the boundaries of kinship. The nature of the 
relationship between the people and the head of state is so kin-like, however, 
that it seems appropriate to refer to modern Communist North Korea as a 
family-state. 
Despite vigorous dissemination and practical implementation of 
Communist ideology, North Korean culture under Communism is thus 
distinctive and bears a strong imprint of Confucianism. The national goal is 
"creation of an ideal society based upon Marxist-Leninist ideology," and the 
nation has an "ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander" (Korea 
Today, 1972, No. 195:11), whose role is much like that of the head of a 
household in the traditional society. He is the absolute authority and the 
source of all wisdom about national affairs, and his management of the state 
resembles the management of a household. Material prosperity achieved 
under Communist rule is believed to be the result of his leadership. So far as 
I can discern, the present integration of North Korean society appears to be 
stronger than it has ever been before in the long Korean history. PrincipIes 
underlying the operation of the family and the lineage in traditional Korea 
are now extended and applied on the national level, and traditional ancestor 
worship has survived in the Kim cult. 
This pattern of transformation under Communism reminds us of the 
famous Confucian reformist Chu Hsi's dream of a new Confucian society "in 
which the ruler would act out of paternal love, as a father would, at the head 
of the centralized government and at the center of the nation, in which the 
peopIe, his loyal subjects, would act, in turn, with an inborn [imperative-by 
personal correspondence] sense of duty. A person could thereby be a father to 
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the family and at the same time a loyal subject of the ruler" (Kang 1971:277). 
What has happened in North Korea for the last quarter of a century may be 
summarized as a transformation into a new Confucian society or family-state 
that is well integrated as an extension of filial piety, expressed through strong 
loyalty to its leader. To some extent, then, it may be said that the society that 
Chu Hsi had dreamed about has materialized in Communist North Korea. 
General improvement in the standard of living has helped to win a 
higher degree of confidence in the socialist system. People have seen that 
none of their leaders is working for his own interests and that their own 
efforts are not wasted. Administrative corruption has not been reported as 
occurring in any sector of North Korea under Communism, other than 
misdemeanors related to the heated competition in campaigns to boost 
production. A notable example of such misdemeanors is "percentage 
pyong," or the percentage syndrome, which refers to the practice of 
emphasizing the quantity of work over the quality, that is, overstating the 
amount of work done (Choson Nyosong, February 1962:24). Since farmers 
manage their farms, there is no room today for personal grievance regarding 
payments for work. An example of how today's farmers feel about their 
changed lives is provided by a North Korean reporter after a trip to the Red 
Flag Cooperative Farm, near Hamhung City. The reporter describes the life 
of a member of Work Team No. 3 of the farm, who had been a farmhand in 
pre-Communist years: 
Bitterly recalling his past life, hard pressed by the Japanese swine and the 
landlord, he related with deep emotion stories about free distribution of the land 
by the leader [Kim 11-sung], formation of the cooperative farm, and about his 
present happy life in the tax-free village. Now he lives in a cozy house provided by 
the state free of charge and does farming with the help of machines. He said with 
emphasis that his share of rice last year would be enough to last his whole family 
for three years. (Korea Today, 1972, No. 194:21) 
Recent North Korean propaganda is loaded with such expressions as 
"the happiness of today." When the improved conditions of people's lives are 
repeatedly compared with those of the past, the comparison undoubtedly 
generates a sense of indebtedness to the socio-political system in which they 
live. The strong human tendency toward anthropocentrism, however, leads 
people to interpret the improvements in their conditions of life as the acts of a 
human leader. 
The sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the leader, in turn, fosters 
unselfish devotion to the society. This seems to be what has happened in 
North Korea, where devotion is measured in part by occupations. Jobs 
involving manual labor are valued over clerical positions, according to my 
informants. Graduates of high school are assigned positions by the 
government, and those who are assigned to clerical positions are said to be 
ashamed of themselves. This circumstance seems to indicate change in the 
attitude toward work. Material rewards may have contributed to the change, 
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN" 121 
since manual labor is generally better paid than clerical or white-collar jobs; 
the spirit of self-sacrifice and a desire for identification with working people 
seem to be more important factors, however. Innovative achievement and 
production that exceeds quotas are also viewed as demonstrations of loyalty 
to the leader. The unit of integration is not the family or lineage based upon 
biological relationship but North Korean society as a whole. The traditional 
virtue of filial piety has been replaced by loyalty on the national level. 
Workers are called upon to fulfill their production quotas as given by the 
nation's leader, and to prove their loyalty to him, Public meetings of almost 
any kind of group have at some time passed resolutions that they shouId 
repay their indebtedness to the leader by hard work. The major slogan of the 
summer campaigns to increase agricultural production is "Let's repay the 
great indebtedness to the Party and the Leader by increased production" 
(Rodong Sinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3, and 11/26/66, p. 1). 
The unification of North Korea was additionally favored by the exodus 
of anti-Communists that I have described. Those who left were mostly 
Christians, intellectuals, and members of well-to-do families, and such 
people of these backgrounds who remain in North Korea are social outcasts 
who, more than other people, must give evidence of dedication to the 
interests of the state, The modern population of North Korea is much more 
homogeneous in social background than the population of former times, a 
factor which also fostered the development of a unified state. Other 
circumstances that particularly favored Communism were the conditions of 
life of the majority of the people, who had little to lose under Communism 
and quickly saw that Communism bettered their lots. 
Still other conditions were involved in the development of a tightly 
unified state. Among these has been the effective use of mass media of 
communication, which are under the firm control of the government. The 
news media consist principally of newspapers, magazines, radio, and, in 
recent years, television. Television sets are not yet available for every 
household, but they are well distributed throughout the nation so that every 
citizen sees broadcasts. Each work team or residential cluster has a television 
receiver, for viewing educational and political broadcasts. Whenever some 
important program is broadcast, all villagers are summoned to their 
neighborhood receivers. Television broadcasts by President Kim are watched 
by most of the nation. According to my informants, the audience behaves as 
if it were actually meeting the leader personally. These broadcasts appear to 
be an important element in the development of the cult-like attitude toward 
him. 
The state monopoly of media of communication appears to have served 
as the major boundary-maintaining mechanism in the integration of the 
sociocultural system. Foreign cultural traits are closely screened; strong 
emphasis is given to native cultural elements, and the communication 
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networks carry little information other than some political news about the 
ways of living of other societies, so that the people live in cultural isolation. 
This isolation is strengthened by a campaign of opposition to foreign nations, 
as described earlier. Every effort has been made to create imaginary enemies. 
The attacks on alleged "foreign evils" have been important in generating 
ethnocentrism, nationalism, and unity in meeting the threats seemingly 
imposed by the enemies. As social scientists interested in the study of conflict 
have often contended, joint hostility toward a common foe may be seen as a 
powerful unifying force. 
A chief function of the media of communication is educational, 
providing people with the latest scientific innovations and indoctrinating 
them in Communist ideology that has been synthesized with national goals. 
The impact of the propaganda campaign seems to be very powerful. 
Newspapers and periodicals are available everywhere, and farmers and 
industrial workers hold news-reading gatherings during lunch hours and rest 
periods while at work or during study periods in the evening, when one 
member summarizes the important news of the day, at home and abroad, or 
reads aloud important items. Papers and magazines are full of stories about 
outstanding achievements of individuals or groups, and technological 
innovations that boost production are well publicized through every medium 
of propaganda. Each agricultural production unit operates like an 
independent experiment station. Whenever and whatever innovations are 
made by one unit become nationally known through the news media. 
Innovations are not always successful, of course. Judgment of their value has 
been practical, and practicality has meant congruence with other aspects of 
Korean culture. The establishment of mass dining halls serves as an example. 
The halls, it was claimed, reduced the work of women, who were traditionally 
responsible for preparing meals, and saved a good deal of labor by the use of 
centralized kitchens and small kitchen staffs of full-time personnel. The 
campaign to establish the halls throughout the nation lauded their 
effectiveness and advantages. Despite the intensive propaganda, however, 
within a couple of years of active operation the halls were found to cause 
inconvenience to farmers and to result in confusion. Once mass dining 
proved to be inefficient, no time was wasted in abolishing it. 
The effective use of media of communication has resulted in a high 
degree of conformity in attitudes, In a sense, every North Korean is a 
spokesman for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Foreign visitors 
usually get the same answers to questions when these are asked of people in 
different 1ocaIities. Through the various political activities in which they 
engage, the people, especially the young, are well trained in debating and 
they are "free" to express their own views at  meetings. Once a resolution is 
adopted at the end of a debate, however, all who are involved are obliged to 
live up to it, regardless of what their own views might be. Otherwise, they 
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would be regarded as deviants or reactionaries. I t  is worthy of note that views 
expressed in the meetings are not allowed to become the cause of blame after 
the meeting has ended or outside the meeting place. The same rule is applied 
to cases of personal verbal attack during meetings. At political meetings in 
which criticism of individuals and self-criticism take place, one person may 
criticize another for failure to be candid. The person criticized may defend 
his position, but the argument must not extend beyond the meeting. Later 
arguing or quarreling constitutes a serious offense. 
